海德堡大學漢學系
INSTITUT FÜR SINOLOGIE

CENTRUM FÜR ASIEN-WISSENSCHAFTEN UND TRANSKULTURELLE STUDIEN

UNIVERSITÄT HEIDELBERG
ZUKUNFT SEIT 1386

Ostasien Aktuell

Working Paper No. 13

THE MASS-ELITE REPRESENTATION GAP IN OLD AND NEW DEMOCRACIES: TWO CAVEATS FOR A GLOBAL LEVEL COMPARISON

JAEMIN SHIM

Politics

East Asia Today Working Paper Series No. 13

June/2021

Title: **The Mass-Elite Representation Gap in Old and New Democracies: Two Caveats for a Global Level Comparison**

Author: **Jaemin Shim**

Ostasien Aktuell Working Paper Series No. 13
Date of publication: 06.2021

The publication of this working paper was supported by the Seed Program for Korean Studies of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-INC-2230004)

OAWP Series
Institute of Chinese Studies, Heidelberg University

"Ostasien Aktuell" is the title of a regular series of lectures and panel discussions organized by the department of Contemporary Studies on East Asia at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Heidelberg University. The series serves as a forum for discussing innovative research approaches and current political, economic and social developments in the Chinese-speaking world, in Japan and Korea, as well as for the diverse exchange processes and entanglements between the region and other parts of the world.

The aim of the "East Asia Today Working Papers" is to share the results of the lecture series with everyone interested and to create an opportunity for further exchange. All articles reflect the perspectives of the respective authors who bear sole responsibility for the correctness of their information and the research results presented here. The Institute of Chinese Studies assumes no liability for the content and its use. All working papers are available in PDF format and can be downloaded free of charge via the website of the institute.

ISSN: 2627-9649
E-mail: ostasien-aktuell@zo.uni-heidelberg.de

Download Link: https://ostasien-aktuell.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/oawp

Zusammenfassung

Angesichts des dringenden Bedarfs an Forschungen über die Diskrepanz zwischen den politischen Präferenzen der Massen und der parlamentarischen Eliten haben die entsprechenden empirischen Arbeiten in den letzten zehn Jahren deutlich zugenommen. Vor diesem Hintergrund lenkt das Papier die Aufmerksamkeit auf zwei Probleme, die sich für die Wissenschaft, die alte und neue Demokratien gleichermaßen untersucht, abzeichnen. Erstens zeigt sich der Massen-Eliten-Vergleich des politischen Links-Rechts-Spektrums auf globaler Ebene in einheitlicher Weise. In Anbetracht der länder-spezifischen Heterogenität in der Beschreibung des politischen Links-Rechts-Spektrums schlägt das vorliegende Papier vor, dass jeder globale Vergleich sorgfältig kontextualisiert werden sollte, indem regionalspezifische Faktoren berücksichtigt werden. Zweitens werden wichtige politische Dimensionen, die von den politischen Eliten geprägt werden, vernachlässigt. In Anbetracht der historischen Entwicklung der alten Demokratien hat sich die bestehende Literatur beim Vergleich der Präferenzen von Massen und Eliten weitgehend auf politische Dimensionen konzentriert, die *bottom-up* geformt wurden. Der vorliegende Beitrag jedoch weist darauf hin, dass die Rolle der politischen Eliten bei der Gestaltung politischer Konflikte in einem *top-down* Prozess ernster genommen werden sollte. Besonders erwähnenswert sind außenpolitische Dimensionen, deren Entstehung die Rolle internationaler Eliten und geopolitischer Faktoren widerspiegelt.

Abstract

As a result of the pressing needs of research on policy preference mismatch between the masses and parliamentary elites, empirical works have seen a marked increase in the last decade. Against this background, this paper draws attention to two problems which loom large in scholarship which covers old and new democracies simultaneously. The first problem concerns the mass-elite comparison of the left-right political spectrum at a global level in a uniform fashion. Given the heterogeneity at the national level in describing the left-right political spectrum, the paper suggests that any global comparison ought to be carefully contextualized by being sensitive to region-specific factors. The second problem pertains to the neglect of key political dimensions shaped by political elites. In a way that reflects the historical trajectories of old democracies in comparing mass-elite policy preferences, current scholarly literature has largely focused on political dimensions that were shaped in a bottom-up manner. However, this paper argues that the role of political elites in shaping political conflicts in a top-down manner should be taken more seriously. Particularly noteworthy are foreign relations-related political dimensions whose creation reflect the role of international elites and geo-political factors.

Über den Autor

Jaemin Shim ist *Assistent Professor* in der Abteilung für Regierungs- und internationale Studien der Hong Kong Baptist University. Vor seiner jetzigen Stelle war er Fritz-Thyssen-Forschungsstipendiat am German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) und Postdoktorand der Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) an der Universität Tokio. Seine Forschungsinteressen liegen hauptsächlich in den Bereichen demokratische Repräsentation, vergleichende Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung, Gender und legislative Politik. Derzeit hat er die Leitung der Projekte „Global Mass-Elite Discrepancy (GMED)“ und „Gender and Policy-Vote Trade-Offs“ inne.

E-Mail: jamesshim83@gmail.com

About the author

Jaemin Shim is an assistant professor at the Department of Government and International Studies at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Prior to the current position, he was a Fritz-Thyssen postdoctoral research fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Tokyo. His primary research interests lie in democratic representation, comparative welfare states, gender and legislative politics. He is currently leading the Global Mass-Elite Discrepancy (GMED) Project and Gender and Policy-Vote Trade-Offs Project.

E-mail: jamesshim83@gmail.com

The Mass-Elite Representation Gap in Old and New Democracies: Two Caveats for a Global Level Comparison

Content

1. Introduction……..... 5

2. Measuring Left-Right in a Global Context……. 7

3. Political Dimensions and the Role of International Elites……..... 10

4. Conclusion…….. 13

5. References……. 15

1. Introduction

Congruence in policy preferences between voters and parliamentary representatives (henceforth, mass-elite congruence) has long been considered a vital quality of representative democracy (Dahl, 1971; Pitkin, 1967; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). Functioning democracy does not mean an immediate response to every expression of public opinion (Dahl, 1956), but it is nevertheless uncontested that any discrepancy should not persist in the long run (Pitkin, 1967). In view of this, a worrying pattern in both new and old democracies has become noticeable.

For instance, sociocultural divisions between religious right-wing and secular left-wing masses have become more and more evident in Indonesia but are not mirrored between parliamentary elites (Ufen, 2019). Similarly, Tunisia shows a deepening of religious divisions at the level of the masses, but not between elected politicians (Farag, 2020). Old democracies[1] are not immune to the divergence between elites and masses either. One of the clearest examples is UK's 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union. In contrast to the "Brexit" result (52–48 percent in favor), pre-referendum surveys showed that more than 80 percent of Westminster legislators preferred to remain in the EU. A similarly stark mass-elite preference gap can be found in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden over the issue of European integration (Costello et al., 2012; Rosema et al., 2010). On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States shows a conspicuous gap between elites who tend to favor the country taking an active role in world affairs and the more "isolationist" tendency of voters (Page and Bouton, 2007). In this sense, it is not surprising that, even if Washington and state elites disapproved of isolationist outlier candidate Donald Trump, he still managed to secure endorsement from about half of the population by claiming 46.2 percent of the popular vote.

Mass-elite policy preference discrepancy does not constitute a less-than-ideal description of democracy but a phenomenon with real effects — one that can be detrimental to the very existence of democracy. For instance, a wealth of empirical research has repeatedly demonstrated that mass-elite incongruence leads to lower support for the political regime, trust in government, and satisfaction with democracy (Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011; Miller, 1974; Muller, 1970). Furthermore, because political representation is a central element of the democratic process, the lack of it has provided

[1] The paper defines old democracies as those countries whose transition to a democratic political regime occurred prior to World War II.

fertile soil for the growth of populism (Kriesi, 2014) — be it right-wing ethno-nationalist or left-wing redistributionist — in both new and old democracies alike.

Reflecting the pressing needs of research on the mass-elite representation gap, related empirical works have seen a marked increase in the last decade. Although specific labels vary from one work to another — for example, "issue representation" (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005), "opinion congruence" (Mattila and Raunio, 2006), "policy representation" (Miller et al., 1999), "issue congruence" (Powell, 2004), or "policy congruence" (Enyedi et al., 2020) — each examines the degree to which elites and the masses match in terms of a broad left-right ideological spectrum or their specific policy positions/priorities. Using pertinent keywords, Shim and Farag (2021) have conducted a systematic meta-analysis based on 111 empirical works published between 1960 and 2020[2], the result of which clearly points to an increasing trend. Specifically, the number of published articles and book chapters has moved from 22 (1960-1999), then to 15 (2000-2009), and then to 74 (2010-2020). To put the increasing trend into perspective, the publication explosion of mass-elite congruence literature after 2010 amounts to twice that of the average increase recorded in the field of political science (Shim and Farag, 2021).

In tandem with the increasing academic salience of the mass-elite congruence theme, another noticeable trend is the internationalization of the field. At the turn of the millennium, the literature began to move beyond the developed western regions to cover democracies in East Asia, Latin America, and MENA regions, e.g. Jou and others on Japan (2017); Luna and Zechmeister on Latin America (2005); Fossati and others on Indonesia (2020); and Farag on Tunisia (2020). Beyond the investigation of hitherto underexplored regions, another noteworthy pattern is the increasing presence of global-level analyses that compare mass-elite congruence among numerous old and new democracies across multiple regions based on the same dataset, e.g. Powell (2013), Dalton et al. (2011), and Hoffmann-Lange (2019). The burgeoning regional diversity in the field is also reflected in Figure 1, which demonstrates the increased proportion of world regions with new democracies since 2010[3]. The meta-analysis results show that this trend coincided with the increasing number of average countries covered per paper or book chapter, moving from 6.6 until 2009 and 11.4 between 2010 and 2020.

[2] Well-qualified empirical contributions to the mass-elite congruence literature are selected using the keyword search function from the Web of Science citation database. Specifically, four keywords were used, i.e. issue congruence, opinion congruence, issue representation, and policy representation, with the selection parameters confined to English-language academic works published in the field of the Political Science.

[3] Despite the increasing regional diversity, still roughly two-thirds of studies cover developed Western democracies.

Figure 1: Geographic Coverage of the Published Works by Period (1960–2020)[4]



The increase in regional diversity and global scope is long overdue in the field and therefore something to be welcomed. Yet, the move beyond developed Western democracies also increases heterogeneity in political contexts and poses more challenges. This heterogeneity particularly concerns new democracies whose democratic origins, party-voter relations, and contents of party competition often differ from that of old democracies. In view of the existing research practices in the field, I would like to draw attention to two problems which loom large for empirical works that cover old and new democracies simultaneously: "global comparison of left-right political spectrum" and "neglect of political dimensions shaped by political elites".

2. Measuring Left-Right in a Global Context

What specifically does the existing scholarship analyze when examining mass-elite congruence? There are two major research approaches to this issue. One is to examine mass-elite preference gap on specific policy issues. The second investigates the mass-elite preference gap according to a broad ideological "left or right" spectrum that is known to summarize general policy stances, shape party competition, and determine the voting choices of the electorate. This is often noted as a "super issue" which is reflective of the major ideological and politicized conflicts that are present within the political system (Gabel and Huber, 2000). When it comes to global-level analysis with regard to both old and new democracies, the most common form of analysis is to compare the left-right ideological scale of

[4] The total number of papers goes beyond 111 because some papers contain more than one region.

elites and masses based on the Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES) dataset[5]. Thanks to the inclusion of questions about respondents and respondents' perceptions of key parties' left-right positions on a 0 to 10 scale, mass-elite congruence can be simultaneously compared across multiple regions. Specifically, it is compared by asking the following two questions: i) In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place [PARTY A] on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?; and ii) Where would you place yourself on this scale?

The frequent global-level application notwithstanding, varying mass-elite congruence levels between different countries derived from the dataset could not be compared in a meaningful way. This is because what "left" or "right" means in a substantive sense is known to be highly context-specific. In other words, the distinction between left and right has nothing to do with a priori issues or principles (Gabel and Huber, 2000) and a plethora of empirical evidence supports the view that its meaning can vary across voters, countries, periods, and parties (Dalton et al., 2011; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Jahn, 2011; Schmitt and van der Eijk, 2009; Zechmeister and Corral, 2013). The latest evidence demonstrates that the perceived meaning of left-right can change over time even within the same political actor (Giebler et al., 2021). Moreover, despite the amorphous nature of left-right classification, its conventional meaning has often been based on socio-economic issues (Huber and Powell, 1994; Sani and Sartori, 1983)[6]. In my view, this generalization was largely possible because the party-politics literature was driven by experiences of Western European countries. However, even within the Western European context, the structure of party competition has become more complex and the uni-dimensional understanding of left-right has reached its limits in capturing policy space (Thomassen, 2012). As a result, socio-cultural issues[7] are increasingly included together with socio-economic issues in understanding multi-dimensional political space (Kitschelt, 1994). Relatedly, the concept of left-right is often equated as a summation of parties' positions on socio-economic and socio-cultural issues (e.g. Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Meyer and Wagner, 2020).

---

5 CSES is a global-level collaborative program of research among election study teams. It includes a common module of post-election survey questions for several dozen old and new democracies. The latest survey is the fifth wave and the first wave of survey goes back to 1996 (for further details, see https://cses.org/).

6 Regarding the socio-economic issues, the primary political dimension is characterized as the state vs. market conflict (also known as "big vs. small government" or "public vs. private"). This divide hinges on the role of government in the economic sphere, with one side emphasizing the idea of small government, low taxation, small deficits, privatization, and minimal welfare provision and the other side advocating for the opposite.

7 The key related political dimensions are often noted as a conflict between liberalism and authoritarianism, materialism and post-materialism, or individualism and collectivism. Often it is collectively described as the Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) conflict (Hooghe et al., 2002), in which issues largely center on identities and ways of life concerning, for instance, law and order, environmental protection, minority equality, and multiculturalism.

Adding nuance to what it means to be left-right in the Western European context is a welcome development, but the recognition of a two-dimensional political space is far from sufficient to apply the left-right concept to global level mass-elite congruence analyses. Firstly, this is because the left-right distinction is often shaped by factors beyond the two policy issue areas. A case in point is issues in foreign relations. For many non-western democracies whose key political conflict lines were shaped by foreign forces during the aftermath of WWII, what it means to be ideological or left-right is often defined in light of foreign relations issues (Shim, 2020). A country's foreign policy stance toward mainland China and North Korea in Taiwan and South Korea respectively are fitting examples of this. At the global level, it should be noted that there are many countries whose major axis of party competition does not revolve around economic or cultural issues (Deegan-Krause, 2007).

Secondly, the direction of pursued policies or groups attached to left and right are more diverse at the global level, which might appear counterintuitive from the conventional perspective. For instance, as manifested by the rise of right-wing populism with an anti-immigration agenda, ethno-nationalism is often associated with "right" in the western context, but it is more attached to the "left" in South Korea, given the left's preference for embracing North Korea because of their shared ethnicity. Considering the authoritarian nature of military regimes around the world, military involvement in politics is often associated with "right", but in Turkey it has been linked to the secular "left" (Aydogan and Slapin, 2015). In a similar vein, in Hong Kong the key cleavage in politics can be found between the pro-democracy camp and the pro-Beijing camp (Ma, 2002). Despite the latter's authoritarian inclination, it is often referred to as "left" owing to its association with communism. Furthermore, when used interchangeably with liberalism and conservatism, "left" and "right" are frequently understood to reflect one's attitudes toward change (Arian and Shamir, 1983; Jost, 2009; Reichley, 1981) — with the left advocating for change while the right is trying to preserve the status quo. However, contrary to these conventional expectations, in Japan it is the right who wants to reverse multiple parts inscribed in the constitution, such as the symbolic status of the emperor, gender equality, recognition of labor unions, and most importantly, article 9 which prohibits Japan from having armed forces (Schmidt, 2003). Going beyond these anecdotal examples, the latest research demonstrates how the unconventional manifestation of left and right in non-western European settings can be systematically analyzed from the viewpoint of historical legacies. A fine example is Kostelka and Rovny's (2019) cross-national comparison of how "right" can be more associated with social protests than "left" in Central Eastern European countries, where, unlike in Western Europe, the right tends to be culturally more liberal while the outgoing dictatorship was largely left-wing.

Thirdly, left-right labels might not carry many policy or ideological connotations in certain contexts. On the one hand, there are numerous countries where other words are used to distinguish political positions or political ideologies, such as conservative-liberal[8] in the US (Arian and Shamir, 1983) or conservative-progressive in Japan and South Korea (Hix and Jun, 2009; Jou et al., 2017). On the other hand, although left-right is frequently used, its meaning can lie beyond the scope of policies or ideologies. For instance, evidence based on numerous post-communist societies demonstrate that left-right orientations are more anchored in partisanship (Jou, 2011).

A simplified distinction such as left and right to analyze the political spectrum has analytical merits, since it reduces a complex political world to a couple of key dimensions (Downs, 1957; Mair, 2007). In scholarship on mass-elite congruence, comparison of left-right will continue to be analyzed along with increasing data availability and the assumption that less left-right discrepancy between the masses and elites indicates a higher probability of preference reflection in overall policymaking. However, the utility of this shortcut should be scrutinized for its global-level application. Specifically, this section has made it clear that, when it comes to comparing left-right political spectrum between masses and elites, researchers should first i) find the correct label to distinguish the political spectrum in the country of interest, asking e.g. whether alternative labels such as progressive-conservative are more frequently used, and ii) they should examine whether the direction and the contents associated with the left-right label deviate from the established understanding based on the experiences of old democracies.

3. Political Dimensions and the Role of International Elites

The two key political dimensions frequently examined in the mass-elite congruence literature have been the state vs. market dimension for socio-economic issues and the Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) dimension for sociocultural issues (Shim, 2019). Both reflect the critical junctures in Western European democracies. For instance, the state vs. market issue dimension traces its origins back to early 20th century Europe, when the masses gained franchise and class conflicts came to the fore as a consequence of industrial revolutions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In the case of socio-cultural issues, the key political dimension of GAL vs. TAN is directly linked to the mobilization of New Social Movements based on gender and racial equality, anti-war, and environmental protection sentiments in the Western democracies in the 1970s and 1980s (Kitschelt,

[8] CSES surveys have also noted “liberal-conservative” or “liberal-authoritarian” as an alternative dimension to “left-right” in New Zealand (wave 1), Poland (wave 2), and Ireland (wave 2).

1994). In both cases, the political dimension was largely formed as a result of a bottom-up process which accommodated both societal structure and voters' attributes.

However, for analysis on new democracies, the role of political elites should be given more weight to understand the origins of a particular political dimension. Key political divides are often not reflections of structural divisions formed in a bottom-up manner. Instead, this is because elites are able to define political divisions by creating identities, forming communities, and reinforcing the structural and cultural distinctiveness of professional groups and classes (Bartolini, 2000; Enyedi, 2005; Kriesi, 1998; Sartori, 1969; Zuckerman, 1975). Studies covering new democracies, such as those in Latin America and post-communist Europe, highlight the power of political elites in defining the dimensions of competition (Mainwaring, 1999; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003). This is not surprising given the fact that elites have more room to maneuvre particular political dimensions due to the lack of institutionalized secondary organizations in many new democracies (Chhibber and Torcal, 1997).

Moreover, in addition to domestic level political elites, we should bear in mind that international elites[9] should be taken seriously in determining which political dimensions will rise to the surface and become politicized. Drawing from the experiences of Western Europe, the process of forming political dimension tends to be viewed as a domestic-level political process. However, we should not neglect the substantially different circumstances between old and new democracies during the period of mass enfranchisement; many new democracies were colonized by old democracies close to the time when they became democratized and/or had to cope with the effects of the Cold War. In other words, they lacked system autonomy. In this context the very contents of party politics were more likely to be shaped by international elites (Randall, 2001). On the one hand, multi-party politics was frequently imposed upon new democracies by old democracies in the immediate post-independence period, which reflects colonial legacies. On the other hand, old democracies played a crucial role in creating the key political dimension that new democracies live with today.

Three developed East Asian democracies — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan — are exemplary cases in this regard which demonstrate how outside influences shape key political dimensions. For instance, in Japan, despite the existence of several left-wing parties — such as the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) — the primary divide was not between socio-economic issues but over the approval or rejection of the Constitution's Article 9 which forbids war as a means to resolving international conflicts and hinders remilitarization. The left (progressives) tends to be anti-

[9] Here, international political elites refer to political elites of foreign governments or leaders in key international organizations.

remilitarization (keeping Japan as a "peace state"), while the right (conservatives) is linked to a pro-remilitarization stance (changing Japan into a "normal state"). The origin of this dimension is external to Japan's domestic politics since the very existence of Article 9 in the Constitution was imposed by the US during the post-war occupation period. In South Korea, the primary issue divide revolved around the country's diplomatic or military stance toward North Korea or the U.S. In particular, the left/right favors a more dovish/hawkish approach to North Korea while holding less-dependent/dependent views towards the U.S. Similar to the Japanese case, the origin of this dimension is exogeneous since the very existence of the North and South divide stems from the confrontation of the two post-war superpowers. In Taiwan, it is a well-accepted fact that the country's diplomatic stance towards mainland China has been the core issue cleavage that determines voting and legislative behavior. The right believes that Taiwan and China should unify, while the left maintains that Taiwan is a sovereign country and should therefore seek recognition from the international community (Tsai and Chao, 2008). Needless to say, the origin of this political dimension was external to Taiwan's internal circumstances since the dimension would have not existed without the KMT fleeing mainland China in the late 1940s after its defeat by the Communist Party.

The political context of these foreign interventions provides us with insight into why foreign relations-related political dimensions are not deeply intertwined at the public level in all three countries. The demand for changes on these issues has been neither highly salient nor divisive at the public level. For instance, a large majority of people in South Korea or Taiwan have preferred the status quo to independence or (re)unification, while, similarly, a stable majority of the Japanese electorate prefer to maintain the non-militarization clause (Article 9) of the "peace constitution". Nevertheless, a significant proportion of elites in all three countries have been determined to change the status quo.

Beyond East Asia, the legacies of the Cold War have casted a long shadow in shaping lasting political divides in numerous Eastern European democracies. In Ukraine, there is a clear political division between Pro- and Anti-Russia views at the level of domestic politics (Zimmerman, 1998). Similarly, the latest empirical evidence suggests that the Pro-Russia vs. Anti-Russia division is the most discernable political difference in Lithuania (Ramonaitė, 2020). In Bulgaria, despite the lack of a sizeable Russian-speaking minority, the process of EU integration involves another larger force, "Russia", which takes a pro-EU vs. pro-Russia form. The Middle East is also no exception to this pattern. In Israel, the key political divide between left and right concerns the relationship of Israel to Palestinians, which divides between the dovish engagement vs. hawkish engagement (Arian and Shamir, 2008). Although this division was firmly crystalized after the Six Day War in 1967, the seeds of the conflict were sown in the early 20th century by external forces such as the Balfour Declaration of the British Empire in 1917.

Other Middle Eastern countries today also show how external influences have the potential to shape key lasting conflicts at the level of domestic politics. For instance, the rivalry between Shia-majority Iran and Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia in the past decades has manifested itself in the form of proxy wars in neighboring states, which has the potential to leave strong imprints on corresponding countries' domestic politics during the period of democratic transition and beyond. Beyond the examples of wars, occupation/trusteeship, or annexation, there are numerous ways in which external influences can affect domestic conflicts in new democracies and potentially result in lasting political divides. Examples include instruments such as media, education, or policy thinktanks, e.g. in Russia and China towards Latin America and Central Europe (Walker, 2016), or structural adjustment requirements imposed by international organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank towards Third World states.

This section highlighted the significance of moving beyond the two key political dimensions — the state vs. market dimension and the Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) dimension — in examining mass-elite congruence for global level analyses. Both dimensions reflect the historical trajectories of the political development in old democracies, so confining one's scope to these two is tantamount to searching for the key under the lamp post. Here I noted that the formation of political dimension tends to be more top-down in new democracies and often reflects the influences of international elites and geo-political factors.

4. Conclusion

Given the increasing importance of understanding the mass-elite policy preference gap, this paper has demonstrated the recent surge in the mass-elite congruence literature and its increasing global orientation. In view of current research practices in the field, the paper has drawn attention to two problems. The first is the mass-elite congruence comparison of left-right political spectrum applied uniformly at the global level. Given the country-level heterogeneity in meaning behind "the left-right" and in view of alternative ways to describe the political spectrum, any global comparison ought to be carefully contextualized. In fact, multiple country mass-elite preference comparison would be more meaningful if it is undertaken at no more than the concrete policy level. The second problem pertains to the neglect of key political dimensions shaped by political elites. In a way that reflects the historical trajectories of old democracies, the paper argues that the existing literature has largely focused on two political dimensions that were shaped in a bottom-up manner. However, this paper has pointed out that the role of political elites in shaping political conflicts in a top-down manner should be taken more seriously. In particular, for analyzing new democracies in East Asia, Middle East, and Eastern

Europe, foreign relations-related political dimensions merit more academic attention whose creation reflect the role of international elites and geo-political factors.

5. References

Arian, Asher, and Michal Shamir. "The Primarily Political Functions of the Left-Right Continuum." *Comparative Politics* 15, no. 2 (1983): 139-158. https://doi.org/10.2307/421673.

Arian, Asher, and Michal Shamir. "A Decade Later, the World Had Changed, the Cleavage Structure Remained: Israel 1996-2006." *Party Politics* 14, no. 6 (November 2008): 685-705. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808093406.

Aydogan, Abdullah, and Jonathan B. Slapin. "Left-Right Reversed: Parties and Ideology in Modern Turkey." *Party Politics* 21, no. 4 (July 2015): 615-625. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813487280.

Bartolini, Stefano. *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980: The Class Cleavage*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521560.

Chhibber, Pradeep, and Mariano Torcal. "Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in a New Democracy: Spain." *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 1 (February 1997): 27-54. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414097030001002.

Costello, Rory, Jacques Thomassen, and Martin Rosema. European Parliament Elections and Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties, *West European Politics* 35, no. 6 (2012): 1226-1248, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.713744.

Dahl, Robert A. *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Vol. 10). Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971.

Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister. *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199599356.001.0001.

Deegan-Krause, Kevin. "New Dimensions of Political Cleavage." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 538-556. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0028.

Downs, Anthony. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." *Journal of Political Economy* 65, no. 2 (1957): 135-150. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1827369.

Enyedi, Zsolt. "The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation." *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 5 (2005): 697-720. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00244.x.

Enyedi, Zsolt, Andrea Pedrazzani, and Paolo Segatti. "Policy Representation in Europe." In *Parliamentary Candidates Between Voters and Parties*, edited by Lieven De Winter, Rune Karlsen and Hermann Schmitt, 164-195. Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2020.

Ezrow, Lawrence, and Georgios Xezonakis. "Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy and Parties' Policy Offerings." *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 9 (September 2011): 1152-1178. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011405461.

Farag, Mahmoud. “Mass-Elite Differences in New Democracies: Tunisia as a Case Study (2010-2016).” *European Political Science* 19, no. 4 (2020): 550-561. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-020-00274-x.

Fossati, Diego, Edward Aspinall, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton. “Ideological Representation in Clientelistic Democracies: The Indonesian Case.” *Electoral Studies* 63 (2020): 102-111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2019.102111.

Franzmann, Simon, and André Kaiser. “Locating Political Parties in Policy Space: A Reanalysis of Party Manifesto Data.” *Party Politics* 12, no. 2 (March 2006): 163-188. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068806061336.

Gabel, Matthew J., and John D. Huber. “Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 94-103. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669295.

Giebler, Heiko, Thomas M. Meyer, and Markus Wagner. “The Changing Meaning of Left and Right: Supply- and Demand-Side Effects on the Perception of Party Positions.” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 31 no. 2 (May 2021): 243-262. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2019.1609001.

Hix, Simon, and Hae-Won Jun. “Party Behaviour in the Parliamentary Arena: The Case of the Korean National Assembly.” *Party Politics* 15, no. 6 (November 2009): 667-694. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068809334555.

Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. “The Development of Political Legitimacy Among MPs and Citizens in Old and Young Democracies.” In *Elites and People: Challenges to Democracy (Comparative Social Research 34)*, edited by Fredrik Engelstad, Trygve Gulbrandsen, Marte Mangset and Mari Teigen, 35-59. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0195-631020190000034003.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson. “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 8 (October 2002): 965-989. https://doi.org/10.1177/001041402236310.

Huber, John D., and G. Bingham Powell. “Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy.” *World Politics* 46, no. 3 (1994): 291-326. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950684.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. “Party Identification, Ideological Preference, and the Left-Right Dimension among Western Mass Publics.” In *Party Identification and Beyond, Representations of Voting and Party Competition,* edited by Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie, 234-273, New York: Wiley, 1976.

Jahn, Detlef. “Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics: Towards a Deductive Approach.” *Party Politics* 17, no. 6 (November 2011): 745-765. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810380091.

Jost, John T. “‘Elective Affinities’: On the Psychological Bases of Left-Right Differences.” Psychological Inquiry 20, no. 2-3 (2009): 129-141, https://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028599.

Jou, Willy. “Left-Right Orientations and Ideological Voting in New Democracies: A Case Study of Slovenia.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 1 (2011): 27-47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27975512.

Jou, Willy, Masahisa Endo, and Yoshihiko Takenaka. “An Appraisal of Japan’s ‘Right Turn’: Citizen-Government Congruence and Ideological Understanding.” *Asian Survey* 57, no. 5 (2017): 910-932. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26367785.

Kitschelt, Herbert. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511622014.

Kostelka, Filip, and Jan Rovny. “It’s Not the Left: Ideology and Protest Participation.” *LSE Eurocrisis: The Politics of Public Discourse in Europe*. November 2019. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2019/11/25/not-the-left/.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. “The Transformation of Cleavage Politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture.” *European Journal of Political Research* 33, no. 2 (May 1998): 165-185. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00379.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. “The Populist Challenge.” *West European Politics* 37, no. 2 (April 2014): 361-378, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.887879.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, ed. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press, 1967.

Luna, Juan P., and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. “Political Representation in Latin America: A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries.” *Comparative Political Studies* 38, no. 4 (May 2005): 388-416. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414004273205.

Ma, Ngok. “Changing Political Cleavages in Post-1997 Hong Kong: A Study of the Changes Through the Electoral Arena.” In *Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong*, edited by Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, 121-139. New York: London: Routledge, 2002.

Mainwaring, Scott P. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Mair, Peter. “Left-Right Orientations.” In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 538-556. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0011.

Mattila, Mikko, and Tapio Raunio. “Cautious Voters-Supportive Parties: Opinion Congruence between Voters and Parties on the EU Dimension.” *European Union Politics* 7, no. 4 (December 2006): 427-449. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116506069434.

Meyer, Thomas M., and Markus Wagner. “Perceptions of Parties’ Left-Right Positions: The Impact of Salience Strategies.” *Party Politics* 26, no. 5 (September 2020): 664-674. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068818806679.

Miller, Arthur H. “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970.” *The American Political Science Review* 68, no. 3 (1974): 951-972. https://doi.org/10.2307/1959140.

Miller, Warren E., Roy Pierce, Jacques Thomassen, Richard Herrera, Sören Holmberg, Peter Esaiasson, and Bernhard Wessels. *Policy Representation in Western Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Muller, Edward N. "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support." *The American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (December 1970): 1149-1166. https://doi.org/10.2307/1958363.

Page, Benjamin I., and Marshall M. Bouton. *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Pitkin, Hanna F. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1967.

Powell, G. Bingham. "Political Representation in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (June 2004): 273-296. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815.

Powell, G. Bingham. "Representation in Context: Election Laws and Ideological Congruence between Citizens and Governments." *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 1 (March 2013): 9-21. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712003635.

Ramonaitė, Ainė. "Mapping the Political Space in Lithuania: The Discrepancy between Party Elites and Party Supporters." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 51, no. 4 (July 2020), 477-496. https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2020.1792521.

Randall, Vicky. "Party Systems and Voter Alignments in the New Democracies of the Third World." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited*, edited by Lauri Karvonen and Stein Kuhnle, 258-279. London, New York: Routledge, 2001.

Reichley, A. James. "The Conservative Roots of the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations." *Political Science Quarterly* 96, no. 4 (Winter 1981-1982): 537-550. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2149893.

Rosema, Martin, Bas Denters, and Kees Aarts, ed. *How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies: Essays in Honour of Jacques Thomassen*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

Sani, Giacomo, and Giovanni Sartori. "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies." In *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, edited by Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, 307-340. London: Sage, 1983.

Sartori, Giovanni. "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology." *Government and Opposition* 4, no. 2 (1969): 195-214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44481916.

Schmidt, Carmen. "Social Cleavages, Voter Alignment, and Dealignment in Japan." Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 35, no. 2 (December 2003): 63-77. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43294473.

Schmitt, Hermann, and Cees van der Eijk. "On the Changing and Variable Meaning of Left and Right." Presentation at the *XXI World Congress of the International Political Science Association*, Santiago de Chile, 2009.

Schmitt, Hermann, and Jacques Thomassen. *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Shim, Jaemin. "Global Analysis of Mass-Elite Discrepancy (GMED). Conceptual, Methodological, and Theoretical Innovations." Project Background Paper, March 2019.

Shim, Jaemin. "Left is Right and Right is Left? Partisan Difference on Social Welfare and Particularistic Benefits in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan." *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 36, no. 1 (April 2020): 25-41. https://doi.org/10.1017/ics.2020.2.

Shim, Jaemin, and Mahmoud Farag. "Blind Spots in the Study of Political Representation: Actors and Political Dimensions." Working Paper, 2021.

Thomassen, Jacques. "The Blind Corner of Political Representation." *Representation* 48, no. 1 (April 2012): 13-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.653229.

Torcal, Mariano, and Scott Mainwaring. "The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973-95." *British Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 1 (2003): 55-84. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123403000036.

Tsai, Chia-hung, and Shuang-Chun Chao. "Nonpartisans and Party System of Taiwan: Evidence from 1996, 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 43, no. 6 (December 2008): 615-641. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909608096657.

Ufen, Andreas. "Lost in Translation? Vanishing Cleavages and Growing Mass-Elite Discrepancies in Indonesia." *ECPR Joint Session* in Belgium, April 2019.

Walker, Christopher. "The Authoritarian Threat: The Hijacking of 'Soft Power'". *Journal of Democracy* 27, no. 1 (January 2016): 49-63.

Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., and Margarita Corral. "Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 6 (June 2013): 675-701. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463880.

Zimmerman, William. "Is Ukraine a Political Community?" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 1 (1998): 43-55. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609346.

Zuckerman, Alan. "Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis." *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 2 (1975): 231-248. http://www.jstor.org/stable/193399.